Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1962

Marian Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Lawrence L. Summerhays, Esq.; Attorney for Appellant;
Edward M. Garrett; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club, No. 9568 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3947

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

MARIAN CORNWALL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

No. 9568

WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY
CLUB,
Defend.ant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
APPEAL FROM 'THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

Hon. Marcellus K. Snow, Judge
Lawrence L. Summe.rhays, Esq.
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

Edward M. Garrett, Esq.
1307 Walker Bank Bui1ding
Salt Lake ·City 11, Utah
Attorney for PUJ,intiff, Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Statement of Facts --------------------------------------------------------------------------

1

Argument -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Point I. The trial court erred in its interpretation of the
contract when it awarded the sum of $1,000 to the plaintiff for the defendant's failure to renew the contract.......

8

8

Conclusion -----------·-----------------------------------------------------------------------------AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Anderson v. Great E:astern Casualty Company (51 Ut. 78,
168 P. 966) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------Loyal Order 1of Moose v. Faulhaber (327 Mich. 244, 41 N.W.
( 2) 535) -------------·---------------------------------------------------------------------Spitzv. Brickhouse, Ill. (124 N.E. (2) 117,49 A.L.R. (2)
675) -------··-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Vitograph, Inc. v- American Theatres Company ~ 77 Ut. 71,
291 p. 303) ·----------------·-·-···-·--····---·--·--------·--··-----·--··-·-·--····---··TEXTS
12 American Jurisprudence, Section 241, pages 773, 77 4__________

12

12 American Jurisprudence, Section 234, page 758____________________

9

14

8

10
9
9

12 American Jurisprudence, page 275' ------------------------------------------ 11

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CAS.E
Insofar as this appe!al is concerned, this is an action
on a written contract to recover the sum of $1,000 which
the plaintiff claims is due under the contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment
for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and
judgment in its favor of no cause of action with respect
to the $1,000.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
:MARIAN CORNWALL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

vVILLOW CREEK COUNTRY

No. 9568

CLUB,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATIEMENT OF FACTS
This case involve1s an action to recover the sum
of $1,000.00 under paragraph six of a written contract
entered into between plaintiff and defendant. Miss Cornwall, the plaintiff in this action, is an interior decorator.
Willow Creek ·Country Club, the defendant, is a Utah
non-profit corporation recently organi~ed and operating as a golf and country club. The parties entered
into a written agreement dated September 22, 1959
(Exh. P-1) in which the plaintiff agreed to furnish her
services to the Club as an interior decorator for the
interior decoration of defendant's new clubhouse. The
contract provid€s in paragraph two that the decorator
shall prepare a master plan for the interior decoration
of the entire clubhouse and further prepare such detailed
plans, sketches, color charts and other materials as shall
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be reasonably necessary to imple1nent the master plan,
and also to specify colors, paints, fixtures and other
materials to he used in the decoration of the clubhouse.
(Exh. P-1, paragraph 2). At the time the contract was
entered into the clubhouse was in the process of being
constructed. (R. 21)
It was kno·wn by both parties at the time the contract was entered into that the Club did not have sufficient fund's to complete the interior decoration, (R. 34,
36, 80) and plaintiff had' been instructed by letter, (Exh.
D-7) written by Mr. Safford, chairman of the Building
Committee to the plaintiff prior to the actual execution
of the written c.ontract that her purchase plan would
take into account the acquisition of furnishings in a
manner so as to make the Club operative, if not complete, with the initial expenditures.
"It must be understood as part of this agreement that you are to develop a master plan for
decorating the -entire premises in a complete and
functional manner even though it is recognized
that we probably cannot buy all furnishings and
accessories at this time to complete your acceptable plans. It is further understood that your
purchase plan will take into account the acquisition of such furnishings in a manner so as to
make our Club operative, if not complete, with
the initial ,expenditures." (Exh. D-7)
Plaintiff admits that at the time the contract was discussed and entered into she knew that the Club did
not have sufficient funds to complete the schedules she
set up for interior decorating.
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Q. ''Now, at the tirne you discussed this contract or entered into the contract vou were advised were you not that the Club did not have
sufficrent funds to complete these schedules which
you have produced here and which are introduced
into evidence as exhibits.
A. "Yes." (R. 34)
It was because of the fact that the Club did not have
sufficient funds to complete the interior decorating that
the provisions set forth in paragraph six were incorporated into the contract. This is corroborated by both
plaintiff and defendant. Mr. Safford, chairman of the
Building Committee, testified as follows concerning this
paragraph in the contract in answer to questions by
defendant's counsel:

Q. "Now, I notice· on those letters (Exh. D-12
and D-7) neither of them contains any provision
with respect to any penalty clause or payment
for $1,000 in the event the contract is not renewed.
A. Well, the discussion regarding the penalty clause, of course, carne up after the letters
because it hadn't been brought up to that point.

Q. And would' you state whether or not you
had a conversation with ::Miss Cornwall about that.
.l\..

Yes, a number of different conversations.

Q. And will you state, if you can, the approximate time of those conversations and in
general what was S'aid by you and what was said
by her.
A. Well, the times of the conversations were
between the time the letters were written and the
actual contract was entered into * * * *
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Q. Now, what was the substance of the conversation with respect to the penalty provision.
A. Well, there were very few points of difference between what we want;ed to accomplish.
We were simply trying to reduce to writing that
which we pretty much had agreed upon. A problem had arisen and it is the reason to the best
of my knowledge for the penalty provision in
the contract. The problem was that we did not
have enough money, which I had told' l\1iss Cornwall, to complete what I as chairman of the Building Committee, and the Building Committee, and
the Board had envisioned as proper furnishings
for the Club. It was physically impossible. As
I recall, there was only $25,000 available at that
time which had to include the kitchen. It was
either $25,000 or $40,000-either one of themwhich would' have been impossible to con1plete
the furnishings and, therefore, a problem as far
as she was concerned, and also a problem as
far .as we were eoncerned was making sure that
the tenure of her contract would be long enough
to carry out the master plan which our contract
called for. Our contract specified, and it was a
prime point, that it include a master plan that
could be followed' through because at that time
we didn't anticipate being able to complete it.
In fact, we knew we couldn't unless something was
done. So our problem was to devise some means
that would assure the Club and also ~fiss Cornwall
of being able to complete the job, whatever she
came up with in the way of specifications. Therefore, she wanted a penalty clause, and I was very
much in favor of it and' recommended it and got
the. approval of the Board of having the penalty
clause in the contract.
Q. Was it discussed as a penalty provision 1
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A. The \vord ''penalty" was used and it was
put in there for a specific purpose which Miss
Cornwall and I discussed on several different
occasion~, the purpose of it being to make sure
that the contract was completed. I insisted with
the Board of Directors that some provision be
made so that 1fiss Cornwall could be retained
through the entire job so that there would be no
changing of horses in the middle of the stream.
Changing decorators in the middle of a job, if
you have any familiarity with decorating, is ridiculous and could have resulted in a substantial
additional expenditure to the Club.'' (R. 80-83)
When _Miss Corn-wall was asked on cross examination about this provision she testified as follows:

Q. "1fiss Cornwall, will you state the discussion you had concerning the provision put
in the contract pertaining to this $1,000 penalty.
A. VVhen I met with N orval Safford in discussion pertaining to the contract, the $1,000
clause was put in to assure me of adequate compensation for doing this particular project. The
percentage that I had agreed upon to work on
was quite a low one and there were other nebulous
things; there were various uncertainties at that
time. For example, one of the most important
discussions in connection with this had to do with
the change of officers or any change that might
influence the working relationship that we had.
And so this particular device was used, as I say,
to assure me of adequate compensation.
Q. Now, that was in the event that they
terminated your service by virtue of putting in
a new Board of Directors to insure that you were
able to complete the work.
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A. Yes.

Q. And that was the primary discussion
that brought the thing about, was it. That actually
it would be for the benefit of both; that the
Board that was in there at that time wanted to
see you complete the project and then you were
interested in not having your services terminated
prior to the completion of the plan that you were
anticipating preparing. Is that it 1
A. The interest was mainly in the working
relationship of the people with whom you are
dealing. An established pattern is developed with
one group of people that you are working with
that may not follow through the same way, but
I wouldn't say that it was the biggest consideration. As I mentioned before, adequate compensation was a consideration because of the percentage figure mentioned." (R. 50, 51)
The plaintiff prepared a master plan for the interior
decoration of the entire clubhouse, (Exh. D-5) and coJor
ciharts, decoration schedules and furnishing and placement lists (Exh. D-6). The master plan was an outline
of e:verything that plaintiff was to do inside the building. (R. 28) All the work outlined in the master plan
and schedules as -well as outside work around the patios
and pool area subsequently outlined and agreed upon
between the parties was complet·ed prior to the expiration of the contract. (R. 32, 34) In order to complete
the program of furnishing the clubhouse and other
proj~ects the club n1mnbers were assessed $350.00 each
enabling .the Club to co1nplete all interior decorating
within the one-year term of the contract. (R. 36, 38, 40)
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Under the provisions of paragraph three of the
contract (I~xh. P-1) the Club agreed to pay a fee to
the decorator of six per cent o.f the Club's purchase
price of all furnishings purchased by the Club during
the term of the agree1nent. At the time plaintiff filed
her action defendant acknowledged there was approximately $200 to $300 still owing to plaintiff under the
tenns of the agrBement, but denied that it owed to
plaintiff the sum of $1,000 claimed by the plaintiff under
paragraph six of the contract.
Paragraphs five and six of the contract provide as
follows:
5. "The decorator is guaranteed a minimum
fee of Fifteen Hundred ($1,500) Dollars. In the
event that purchases of furnishings by the Club
shall not be sufficient in amount as to permit
the decorator a Fifteen Hundred ($1,500) Dollar
fee, on the basis of six ( 6%) per cent of the price
of the furnishings purchased by the Club during
the term of the agreement, the difference between
the amount the decorator has been paid and Fifteen Hundred ($1,500) Dollars shall he paid to
decorator within thirty (30) days after the expiration of this contract."
6.

"This contract shall be for a term of one

(1) year from the date hereof, and may be re-

newed by the Club upon the same terms, for an
additional one (1) year, by giving written notice
of renewal to the decorator at least thirty (30)
days prior to the date of expiration. In the event
that the contract is not renewed, the Club shall
pay the decorator an additional fee of One Thousand ($1,000) Dollars."
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The trial court found that after the date of the
contract on September 22, 1959 there became due and
owing to plaintiff from the defendant on account for
S'ervices, merchandise and sales tax (stipulated at $50)
(R. 18) the sum of $7,577.41, and that defendant had
paid to plaintiff the sum of $7,293.59, leaving a balance
of $283.82. (In excess of $4,000 was fee.) Court further
found that defendant owed to plaintiff the sum of $1,000
under paragraph six of the contract because defendant
failed to renew the contract. This award of $1,000 is
the only point involved in the appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the
contract when it awarded the sum of $1,000 to the
plaintiff for defendant's failure to renew the contract.
In construing a contract the true object is to arrive
at the intention of the parties, to he ascertained by
considering the object and purpose of the parties in
making the agreement. Anderson vs. Great E.aste,rn
Casualty Company (51 Utah 78, 168 P. 966).
An agreement should be integrated as a whole and
the meaning gathered from the entire context and not
from particular words, phrases or clauses. In fact, the
entire agreement is to be considered to determine the
meaning of each part. All provisions of it, if possible,
should be so interpreted as to harmonize with each other.
Where a contract a.s a whole discloses a given inten-
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tion and certain words or clauses would, if taken literally,
defeat the intention they will be interpreted, if possible,
so as to be consistent with the general intent. Vitograph,
Inc. vs. American Theatres Company, (77 Utah 71, 291
P. 303, 12 Am. Jur. Section 241, pages 773-774).
Under paragraph two of the contract the decorator
1s required to prepare a master plan for the interior
decoration of the entire clubhouse (Exh. P-1). Basically,
the sole object of the contract was the complete decoration of the clubhouse. The decoration of the outside
patios and the pool area was also included. When both
of these jobs were done, and both were done within the
yearly tenn of the contract, (R. 32, 34) the work of the
interior decorator was finished.
The only intent to he derived from reading the contract is that the parties entered into a contract for
the completion of the interior decorating of the clubhouse. The defendant contends that this work, having
been completed, there was no contract to be renewed;
that in view of the fact that the parties were contracting for the particular work to be done and that it had
been done, the contract was terminated. The contract
has to be interpreted in the light of the circumstances
under which it was made, and the ·Court may take into
consideration the conferences and correspondence between the parties pending the negotiations of the agreement. (12 Am. Jur. Section 234, page 758.) When the
circumstances and the correspondence and preliminary
negotiations pending this agreement are considered one
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comes to the obvious conclusion that lack of funds and
a desire to continue the services of the decorator until
her plan for decorating was completed led to the insertion of paragraph six into the contract.
The contract was incomplete in that it did not have
a provision in it with respect to the termination to be
effected by completion of the object of the contract.
F'or that matter, it was incomplete in other particulars
in that it failed to mention the decoration contemplated
of the patios and pool areas unless it be assumed that
the term interior decoration includes these areas. Under
these circumstances courts have allowed evidence to be
introduced to show the understanding of the parties and
their intention with respect to the incomplete provisions.
Thus in the case of Spitz vs. Brickhouse, (1954, Ill. 124.
N. E. (2) 117, 49 ALR (2) 675) the parties executed
a standard American Institute of Architects form contract (A.I.A. providing that the architect was to receive
fees at the basic rate of ten per cent of the ''cost of
the work,'' defining the ''cost of the work" as the cost
to the owner exclusive of architect fees and providing
for preliminary payments of various percentages of the
basic rate computed upon a "reasonable estimated cost.''
The court held the agreement was ambiguous and incomplete in that it was silent as to the size, style and
quality of the house and that it would be unreasonable
to suppose that the owner entered into a contract which
would bind him to accept a house at any cost which the
architect might design especially in view of the provision
for payment cmnputed on a "reasonable estimated co.st."
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The court, therefore, allowed parol evidence to be introduced to determine the intention of the parties and a
parol agremnent that the cost of the house would not
exceed $25,000.
The agreement 1n the case before this court is
an1biguous and incomplete. It sets out the work that
is to be done-complete interior decoration- and also
provides for a fee on the basis of a percentage of the
purchase cost of the interior decorations with a minimurn
provided in the event the fee does not amount to $1,500,
and further provides for a penalty fee in the event the
contract is not renewed. It does not mention termination by completion of the performance of the work that
is to be done and it is ambiguous and incomplete in
this respect. It would be unreasonable to suppose that
the defendant in this case would enter into a contract
for a penalty provision for the defendant''s failure to
renew a contract which was completed. If defendant
renewed the contract it would have to pay a minimum
fee of $1,500 when there were no purchases to be made,
and if it didn't renew defendant would pay a penalty
of $1,000 when there was nothing further to be done.
Certainly this is ambiguous and the contract must be
interpreted that if there was work yet to be done by
the decorator for which a fee would be payable and
defendant failed to renew the contract the defendant
would pay to the plaintiff the sum of $1,000 for its
failure to renew the contract. In 12 Am. J ur. Page 275
the rule is set forth which we think applies to this
provision of the contract :
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''Whatever is necessarily implied in a contract is as much a part thereof as if expressly
stated therein, but the implication must result
from the language employed in the instrument
or be indispensable to carry the .intention of the
parties into effect." (Italics ours.)
Paragraph six of the contract should be interpreted
to read in the following manner:
This contract shall be for a term of one year
from the date hereof and may be renewed by the
Club upon the same terms for an additional one
year by giving a written notice of renewal to the
decorator at least thirty days prior to the date
of expiration. In the event that the contract is not
renewed and there is work yet to be d-one by the
decorator for which a fee would be payable, the
Club shall pay the decorator an additional fee of
$1,000. (Italics ours).
In the case of Loyal Order of Moose vs. Faulhaber,
327 Mich. 244, 1950, 41 N. W. (2) 535, the standard
A.I.A. form contract was held not to be free from
ambiguities, so that it was proper to show by parol
testimony the actual situation that existed to the knowledge of the architect as well as the owner. The court
held that upon evidence that the architect was informed
before ·entering into the contract that the owner did
not have the necessary funds to carry out the work he,
therefore, must 'have known that the undertaking was
uncertain and contingent and so was not entitled to
recover where the owner was unable to raise funds to
carry out the work on the scale planned by the architect
and finally did the work according to other plans.
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Our case is different somewhat from this but the
principle upon which the case was decided is applicable
to our case. The decision was based upon the understanding of the parties as it must have been in view
of the known existing conditions at the time the· contract
wa~ entered into. In the case of Miss Cornwall vs. Willow Creek Country Club both parties realized and knew
that there were insufficient funds available to complete the decorator's plans for the interior decoration
and paragraph SL"'{ of the: contract was inser•ted with
this thought in mind. Adequate provisions were put
into the agreement to protect the decorator in her fee
because the Club didn't hav-e sufficient funds available
at the time to perform the work at once. She admits
that she knew this fact and she states that the: provision
was put in the agreen1ent to assure that she received
adequate compensation in the event there was a change
in the Board of Directors which might have some idea
of changing decorating plans. (R 15, 51) It would be
an injustice to allow her to reeover $1,000 under these
circumstances where the total work to be done had been
completed before the time for the renewal arrived.
~either party had anticipated any additional fee other
than the six per eent of purchase with a $1,500 minimum
as is evidenced by their letters written prior to the
execution of the contract, (Exh. D7 and Dl2) and it is
clear from the evidence on both sides that the purpose
of paragraph six in the contract was to insure the completion of the contract by the plaintiff and the defendant.
Having con1pleted the contract in full and finished all
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planned decorating inside and out, plaintiff was not
entitled to a penalty fee for defendant's failure to renew
the contract. Plaintiff had received all the compensation contemplated by the parties for full performance
of it. Plaintiff claims there were some additional things
to be done and cites in support thereof a letter written
on the 12th of July, 1960 (Exh. P-9) in which plaintiff
sets forth certain observations concerning the operation
of the Club after the decorating had been completed.
A reading of this letter indicates that it was written
in response to complaints on the part of members or
officers of the Club which, in fact, were the basis of
the defendant's counter claim in this action and that
it did not call for or suggest any additional work on
the part of the plaintiff for whicJh an additional fee
would be owing, nor was irt a part of the master plan
that was originally prepared by the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that a fair analysis of
this written contract as a whole considered in the light
of the existing circumstances at the time it was entered
into clearly establishes that the true intention of the
parties at the time the contract was executed was that
the $1,000 provided for in paragraph six in the event
the d!efendarut failed to renew the contract would be
payable only in the event that there ·was additional
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work to be done by the decorator under the contract
for which a fee was payable, and the Club failed to
renew it. Since the evidence is clear that the work had
all been completed under the contract the trial court's
judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

LAvVRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
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